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Abstract
The willingness of banks to provide funding for real estate purchases depends
on the creditworthiness of their borrowers. Beside other factors, the creditworthi-
ness of borrowers depends on the development of real estate prices. Real estate
prices, in turn, depend on the demand for homes which is in°uenced by the will-
ingness of banks to provide funding for real estate purchases. In this paper I
develop a theoretical model which describes and explains this circular relation-
ship. Using this model, I show how di®erent kinds of expectation formations can
lead to °uctuations of real estate prices. Furthermore, I show that banks make
above average pro¯ts in the upswing phase of the real estate cycle but su®er high
losses when the market turns.
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The recent crisis in the US sub-prime mortgage market has illustrated that problems
in the housing market can have a pronounced impact on the banking sector. When
real estate prices in the US started to grow substantially in the late 1990's the wealth
of sub-prime borrowers increased also and, as an e®ect of the higher wealth, default
rates decreased. This development made it more and more pro¯table to invest in sub-
prime mortgages and banks and other ¯nancial institutions invested more and more
money into the housing market. In doing so, they were fueling the bubble and created
a positive feedback e®ect between real estate prices, default rates, and mortgages.
Growing real estate prices have a positive e®ect on the wealth of borrowers, however,
on the other hand they also lead to a higher mortgage burden. In 2006 the real estate
price increase slowed down and the wealth e®ect of increasing real estate prices became
too small to compensate for the high mortgage burden. As a result default rates among
sub-prime borrowers started to rise again. This led to losses for sub-prime lenders and
lending standards were tightened. The tighter lending standards together with the
high mortgage burden led to a situation where many borrowers were forced to sell
their homes or became insolvent.
The described cyclical relationship between real estate prices, default rates, bank
pro¯ts and mortgage lending is not a new development. Real estate crises have led
to problems in the banking sector already in the past. In countries such as Japan
(JAP), Norway (NOW), Switzerland (CH), the UK, and the US, for example, bank
lending grew substantially in the mid/late 1980's. This development was accompanied
by a strong increase in real estate prices. Around 1990 in each of these countries the
housing bubble burst. In reaction to this, default rates among borrowers and loan
losses at banks increased and some banks got into server problems.1
Table 1 shows the correlation between annual growth rates of bank loans and annual
growth rates of real estate prices for the above mentioned ¯ve countries. As we can see,
this correlation is quite high, with an average of 70%, ranging between 55% in NOW
and 85% in JAP. In addition, Table 1 shows the correlation between annual growth
rates of real estate prices and the fraction of non-performing loans. This correlation is
highly negative, with an average of -54%, a minimum of -68% (US), and a maximum
of -48% (JAP).
1BIS (2004) describes the development of the banking crises in all of these countries.
1Figure 1 demonstrates the close relationship between mortgages, real estate prices
and charge-o® rates for the US market. In addition, the ¯gure displays the development
of the lending conditions of US banks according to the Senior Loan O±cer Opinion
Survey on Bank Lending Practices of the Federal Reserve.2 As we can see, the fraction
of the reporting banks that have tightened their mortgage lending policies over the
previous three months is re°ective of the changes in the charge-o® rates on real estate
loans (delta charge-o®). The correlation between these two series is almost 90%. This
indicates that the lending condition of banks might be in°uenced by the performance
of their existing loan portfolio.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The relationship between real estate cycles and bank exposures is examined in a
number of studies. Gerlach and Peng (2005), for example, examine the relationship
between property prices and bank lending in Hong Kong. Their results suggest that
the development of property prices in°uences bank lending. Collyns and Senhadji
(2002), on the other hand, look at Asian countries during the Asian Crisis and ¯nd
evidence that lending in°uences property prices. Mora (2008) ¯nds evidence that bank
lending is a possible explanation for the Japanese real estate boom during the 1980's
and following Hofmann (2004) the development of property prices helps to explain
long-run movements of credit in a sample of 16 industrialized countries.
In general one can say that the relationship works in both ways, meaning that there
is a positive feedback e®ect between real estate prices, mortgage loans and bank pro¯ts.
Collyns and Senhadji (2002, p. 6) provide a motivation for this feedback e®ect:3
\Increases in the price of real estate may increase both the value of bank
capital, to the extent that banks own real estate, and increase the value of
real estate collateral, leading to a downward revision of the perceived risk
of real estate lending. Consequently, an increase in real estate prices may
2See Federal Reserve Board (2009).
3These factors are also mentioned by Herring and Wachter (1999, p. 3). In addition they point
out that the development of real estate prices might also in°uence the perceived risk in real estate
lending.
2increase the supply of credit to the real estate industry, which in turn, is
likely to lead to further increases in the price of real estate. These feedback
e®ects go into reverse when real estate prices start to decline."
There are several models which formalize these basic e®ects. Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), for example, develop a model where a ¯xed stock of land is used for production.
At the same time credit constrained ¯rms use their land as collateral to borrow money.
If we suppose that there is a temporary productivity shock, ¯rms will earn less and,
therefore, can invest less in the factor land. This reduces their output further and,
since the supply of land is ¯xed, the value of their land is reduced. Because of the
reduced value of their collateral, ¯rms can borrow less, reducing their demand for land
further and so on.
Iacoviello (2005) develops a model where households supply their labor force and
lend money to entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs produce by using labor and real estate as
input factors. To ¯nance the input factors they can borrow money from the households.
The author further assumes that the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs is constrained
by their collateral: the value of their housing stock.4 In this setting Iacoviello shows
that shocks can be ampli¯ed due to a procyclical development of the real estate price
and, therefore, of the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the model is
able to explain the positive relationship between consumption and real estate prices.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) describe a very similar process in a real business
cycle model. However, they consider a general capital good as an input factor for
production instead of real estate. Also in their model the feedback e®ect between
lending and real estate prices is kept alive because of a link to productivity. Each of
these models relies on rational expectations and the resulting real estate cycles re°ect
changes in fundamentals (productivity). When we look at actual real estate price
movements, however, prices seem to °uctuate much stronger than fundamentals like
GDP or interest rates would justify.5 This fact can hardly be explained by standard
rational agent models and is often associated with irrational expectations.6
4Very similar models are used in Iacoviello (2004) and Calza et al. (2007).
5Clayton (1997) shows that real estate prices in Vancouver °uctuate than their rational expectation
values. Hott and Monnin (2008) calculate fundamental real estate prices for Japan, the Netherlands,
Switzerland, the UK and the US. Their results also indicate that actual real estate prices are much
more volatile than their fundamental values.
6Akerlof and Shiller (2009), for example, emphasize the role of irrational expectations in real estate
cycles.
3In this paper I show how credit and real estate cycles can be produced by irrational
expectations of banks. More precisely I examine the e®ects of three di®erent kinds of
expectation formations on the lending behavior of banks, on real estate prices, and on
mortgage losses of banks. In a ¯rst approach I show how mood swings can in°uence
expectations and how this can generate cycles. If the default rate on mortgage loans
decreases, a bank gets more optimistic about the creditworthiness of its customers.
This leads to higher mortgage loans, higher real estate prices, and lower default rates.
When the price increase gets too low to justify the high real estate price level, default
rates increase again. Now the process is reversed and banks become more pessimistic.
In a second approach I show how momentum forecasts can produce property price
cycles. If the forecast of real estate prices is in°uenced by their momentum, a real
estate price increase has a positive e®ect on the forecast of future real estate prices.
This, in turn, has a positive e®ect on the actual real estate price. Therefore, forecasts
become self-ful¯lling and banks have no incentive to change their forecasting model.
The process is reversed after a while because forecasts rely not only on the momentum
of prices, but also on the development of fundamentals.
Herring and Wachter (1999, p. 15) name another possible reason for the pronounced
pro cyclical behavior of mortgages: disaster myopia. Following this idea there is a:
\... tendency over time to underestimate the probability of low-frequency
shocks. To the extent that subjective probabilities (¼t) decline even though
actual probabilities remain constant or increase, banks take on greater ex-
posures relative to their capital positions and the banking system becomes
more vulnerable to a disaster."
Real estate markets are very vulnerable to this kind of disaster myopia because
cycles are usually rather long and, as a result, downturns or crises occur seldom. In my
third approach I show how this disaster myopia can lead to real estate price °uctuations.
For all three model variations I also show that price °uctuations lead to high pro¯ts
in upswing phases and to high losses when the bubbles burst.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section I develop the basic model of
banks, households, mortgages, and real estate prices. In the third section I present the
three model variations and explain the occurrence of price bubbles. In the last section
I o®er some concluding remarks.
42 The Basic Model
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005), and Calza et al. (2007) use very similar
general equilibrium models to describe the link between loans, real estate prices, and
economic performance. Each of these models assumes that there are two goods: a
consumption good and real estate. Real estate is used as an input factor for the
production of the consumption good (in Kiyotaki and Moore and Iacoviello) or serves
utility directly (in Calza et al.). There are two groups of agents: borrowers and lenders.
One crucial di®erence between these two groups is that borrowers discount the future
at a higher rate than lenders. This assures that borrowers want to borrow up to the
limit. This borrowing constraint is given by a ¯xed fraction (loan-to-value) of the value
of their housing stock. Aggregated income is calculated endogenously via a production
function.
In the following I present the basic model for my examination of the interaction
between the lending behavior of banks, real estate prices, and loan losses. This model
has many features of the aforementioned models. There are two reasons, however, why
my model has to di®er in some aspects: Firstly, while the focus of the aforementioned
models is on the borrowers sector (households) and the link to the economic perfor-
mance, my examination focuses on the lenders (banks) and the link to loan losses.
Therefore, I have to explicitly model the lending behavior of banks and consider het-
erogeneous households to get default rates between 0 and 100 percent. Secondly, I use
my basic model to examine the e®ects of various kinds of bank expectations. In order
to have the necessary °exibility, the model has to be much simpler than many other
papers. Therefore, instead of using a general equilibrium model, I develop a partial
equilibrium model, taking income as an exogenous factor.
2.1 The Real Estate Market
Like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Iacoviello (2005), I assume that there is a ¯xed
supply S of identical homes. In period t the price of each home is Pt. This price ensures
that the demand for homes is equal to the supply. Hence, in t the total stock of homes
is worth SPt. For simplicity and without loss of generality, I assume that S = 1. In
contrast to Kiyotaki and Moore and Iacoviello I assume that homes are only held by
households (borrowers) and not by banks (lenders). This assumption does not a®ect
5my results qualitatively7 but, as we will see later, it simpli¯es the determination of the
real estate price a lot.
2.2 The Market for Mortgage Loans
The demand side of the mortgage market is given by households' demand for mortgage
loans (see section 2.3). Banks supply these mortgage loans with a maturity of one
period. Like Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) I assume that the mortgage rate m > 0 and
the loan-to-value (LTV) are constant.8 For simplicity I assume that the LTV is 100%.
In combination with the assumption that only households buy and hold the housing
stock, this implies that the amount of the sum of all mortgages is equal to the value of
the entire housing stock (Pt). This is a rather strong assumption. However, it re°ects
the empirical ¯nding that the development of real estate prices and mortgages is highly
correlated.9
2.3 The Household Sector
I assume that households derive their utility from consumption and housing. Further
I assume that households have a very high discount rate (higher than the mortgage
rate). As shown by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2004 and 2005), and Calza
et al. (2007), this implies that the borrowing constraint is binding for households. As a
consequence, in combination with a LTV of 100%, households take the highest amount
of mortgages they can get to purchase housing units and they use their entire income
for paying their mortgage and for consumption.
I assume that there are N households, where N is very large. In period t each
household owns and has to ¯nance the same fraction 1=N of the housing stock by
taking a mortgage loan in the amount of Pt=N.10 Hence, in period t the mortgage
duty of each household is: mPt¡1=N. On the other hand, households have an income
7As long as the demand of additional participants does not react perfectly elastic on changes in
prices, they would only reduce the price e®ects of the transactions of the households but would not
eliminate them.
8Iacoviello (2005) and Calza et al. (2007) also assume that the LTV is constant, however, they do
not assume that the interest rate is ¯xed. Instead of adjusting the mortgage rate, in my model banks
consider and adjust the a®ordability. See section 2.4.
9See Table 1 and Figure 1.
10Since households do not save money they all have the same expected future wealth. Therefore, it
is quite reasonable to assume that all households buy the same fraction of the housing stock and that
banks are willing to provide the same mortgage amount to every household.
6from capital gains: (Pt ¡ Pt¡1)=N, which is positive if the real estate price increases
and negative if the real estate price decreases. In addition to the capital gain, in
each period t household i (i = 1;::;N) receives a random labor income (Y i
t ) which is
uniformly distributed between 0 and ¹ Y , where Y i
t is independent from Y
j
t (j 6= i) and
Y i
t¡x (x > 0). Hence, the labor income of all households in each period t is uniformly
distributed between 0 and ¹ Y . If the mortgage duties of a household exceed its total
income the household becomes insolvent. Figure 2 shows which households become
insolvent and which stay solvent. Thereafter, in t the probability of default (PDt) is:
PDt =
(1 + m)Pt¡1 ¡ Pt
N ¹ Y
: (1)
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
I assume that insolvent households have to sell their housing units and then use their
entire wealth to pay back their mortgage and the corresponding interest rate (or at least
as much as they can).11 In Figure 2 the vertical shaded area left of the dashed insolvency
line re°ects the amount of mortgage payments of the insolvent households. Since
the future income of each household is independent of today's income even following
insolvency a households can go straight to the next bank and ask for a new mortgage to
buy a home. In this respect the households in my model are very similar to sub-prime
borrowers.
Since the maturity of each mortgage is one period, solvent households re¯nance
their mortgage every period, no matter if they buy a new (identical) homes or stay in
the same home. In Figure 2 the vertical shaded area right of the dashed insolvency line
re°ects the amount of mortgage payments of the solvent households and the horizontal
shaded area re°ects total consumption of households. As we can see, consumption is
positively related to changes in real estate prices. This result re°ects the ¯ndings of
Iacoviello (2005).
2.4 The Banking Sector
The fourth element is the banking sector: I assume that banks are identical, risk neutral
and cannot ex ante distinguish between the di®erent households. However, they know,
11In my model banks do not have an incentive to own real estate and to speculate on the real estate
market.
7at least in the basic model, the expected income of each household and its distribution.
Further, I assume that there is perfect competition in the banking sector. Banks
provide mortgages to households at the constant rate m > 0 and re¯nance themselves
at the constant rate r, where 0 < r < m. Hence, in t + 1 the interest margin income
of the banking sector is Pt(m ¡ r). I assume that banks do not in°uence the (market)
mortgage rate and only decide on the amount of mortgages (Pt=N) they give to the
di®erent households. Since banks cannot distinguish a priori between \good" and
\bad" households, they also give mortgages to households that will default in the next
period. Because of defaults, in period t+1 banks' earnings are reduced by the fraction
½t+1 of their mortgage exposure Pt. Therefore, expected pro¯ts (¼t+1) of the entire
banking sector in period t + 1 are given by:
E(¼t+1) = Pt[m ¡ r ¡ E(½t+1)]: (2)
The vertical shaded area in Figure 3 re°ects the interest rate margin income of the
banks and the horizontal shaded area re°ects the expected losses in t + 1. Expected
pro¯ts of the banking sector are given by the di®erence between these two areas. Since
I have assumed that there is perfect competition in the banking sector, expected pro¯ts
are zero. Hence, in equilibrium the two areas have to be identical. If, for example, the
margin income is higher than expected losses, expected pro¯ts would be positive. As a
result banks would be willing to provide more or higher mortgage loans. By doing this
they move the \mortgage duty" line (mPt=N) as well as the \re¯nancing costs" line
(rPt=N) upwards. In addition to this, the higher amount of mortgage loans increase
today's real estate price (Pt). Given the expected real estate price in t+1, this reduces
the expected capital gain of households and, therefore, pushes the \income" line in
Figure 3 downwards. Both e®ects have no in°uence on the interest rate margin (m¡r)
but increase the expected loss rate (½t+1). Banks now increase the amount of mortgage
loans until:
E(½t+1) = m ¡ r: (3)
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
In other words, competition leads to a mortgage rate which is equal to the (save)
¯nancing rate r plus a risk premium E(½t+1). However, in my model banks do not
8chose a mortgage rate that covers the risk premium. Instead they look at the amount
of mortgage loans that households can a®ord at a given mortgage rate. Accordingly,
banks provide mortgages as long as expected losses can be covered by the interest rate
spread.12 Therefore, my model is a simple example for credit rationing under imperfect
information µ a la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
2.5 Equilibrium
Beside the labor income, expected losses mainly depend on the development of real
estate prices. One can think of three di®erent cases: First, the development of real
estate prices leads to a situation where some households become insolvent and some
stay solvent. Second, a huge price increase leads to a situation where all households
stay solvent. Third, a strong decrease in real estate prices leads to a situation where
all households become insolvent. The expected losses can be calculated for the three
di®erent cases as follows:
PtE(½t+1) =
[(1 + m)Pt ¡ E(Pt+1)]
2
2N ¹ Y
if (1+m)Pt ¸ E(Pt+1) ¸ (1+m)Pt¡N ¹ Y ; (4)
PtE(½t+1) = 0 if E(Pt+1) > (1 + m)Pt and (5)
PtE(½t+1) = (1 + m)Pt ¡ E(Pt+1) ¡
1
2
N ¹ Y if E(Pt+1) < (1 + m)Pt ¡ N ¹ Y : (6)
In the second case expected losses are always zero. Hence, for positive interest rate
margins the second case is not a possible equilibrium. With \normal" interest rate
margins the third case can only be an equilibrium if real estate prices in period t are
very high and expectations are that real estate prices will decrease substantially in the
next period. However, since in my model the underlying fundamentals of real estate
prices (number of households, income, interest rates) stay constant, in equilibrium, real
estate prices have to be constant as well. Therefore, the relevant case is the ¯rst one.
I de¯ne ¹ P = Pt = E(Pt+1) as the equilibrium (benchmark) real estate price and ¹ ¼ as
the equilibrium (benchmark) pro¯ts. By using equation (4) I can rewrite equation (2)
to:
12Using data from the Federal Reserve Bank's \Loan O±cer Opinion Survey" Lown and Morgan
(2006) emphasis the importance of credit standards compared to the role of loan rates for bank loans.
9¹ ¼ = ¹ P
µ







Following the assumption that banks are under perfect competition and that they
expect to make zero pro¯ts, the equilibrium real estate price (and therefore the equi-
librium amount of mortgage loans) is given by:
¹ P = 2
(m ¡ r)N ¹ Y
m2 : (8)
Hence, the equilibrium real estate price depends positively on the interest margin
(or risk premium of banks), the number of households and their labor income and
negatively on the mortgage rate. These ¯ndings are in line with the results of many
studies on real estate prices.13
3 The Behavior of Banks
The basic idea of this paper is that there is a feedback e®ect between default rates,
mortgage loans and real estate prices. It is easy to see that higher mortgage loans
have a positive impact on real estate prices and that increasing real estate prices
lower default rates.14 The important missing link, however, is the link between default
rates and the supply of mortgage loans. As we have seen in section 2, the supply of
mortgages is mainly driven by banks' expectations with regard to future income and
future real estate prices. As long as banks make appropriate forecasts, or at least make
no systematic mistakes, nothing happens. In this section, however, I argue that the
behavior of banks can lead to a cyclical development of real estate prices, to above
average returns for banks in the upswing phase and to losses in the downswing phase.
There are many reasons why we should look at the behavior of banks. One is
that there are often explicit or implicit government guaranties for the liabilities of
banks. Krugman (1998), for example, shows how this can lead to a moral hazard
behavior of banks. Since banks do not bear all the risk of their decisions, they tend to
13In Hott and Monnin (2008), the fundamental value of houses depends on aggregated income,
housing supply and mortgage rates. Case and Shiller (2003) and Holly and Jones (1997) point out
that income is most important factor. Beside other factors, Himmelberg et al. (2005) consider a
mortgage interest rate and an expected capital gain.
14These e®ects are made explicit in the basic model.
10invest more into risky assets (for example the housing market) and, therefore, drive up
prices. Another reason why the behavior of banks can be relevant is the informational
asymmetry between lenders (banks) and borrowers (households). This can lead to
adverse selection and, according to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), to credit rationing.
This paper focuses on another aspect of the behavior of banks: expectation forma-
tion. In the following I apply three di®erent kinds of expectation formations to the
basic model that are especially relevant for real estate cycles and the current crisis in
particular. Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p. 4) write:
\The idea that economic crises, like the current ¯nancial and housing cri-
sis, are mainly caused by changing thought patterns goes against standard
economic thinking. But the current crisis bears witness to the role of such
changes in thinking. It was caused precisely by our changing con¯dence,
temptations, envy, resentment, and illusion - and especially by changing
stories about the nature of the economy. These intangibles were the reason
why people paid small fortunes for houses in corn¯elds; why others ¯nanced
those purchases;..."
And on page 151 the authors write:
\People appear to have di®erent, but equally inexplicable, quirks in pre-
dicting the trajectory of real estate prices. The idea that they will always
go up strongly, and even that real estate is the best investment of all, is
somewhat seductive. But it has not been uniformly prominent. Outside of
booms it is hard to ¯nd statements that real estate prices will always go
up."
These statements can be divided into three di®erent aspects: Firstly, people are more
con¯dent when there is a boom and they are less con¯dent when prices are going
down. If con¯dence is contagious (story telling) it could lead to herding behavior
and mood swings. In my ¯rst approach I demonstrate how such mood swings can
lead to credit and real estate cycles. The second aspect is that people extrapolate
past developments. Such momentum forecasts can become self ful¯lling and, therefore,
create price °uctuations. This e®ect is described in my second approach. The third
aspect is that crises can be caused by changes in thought patterns. Such a switch
11in thinking or expectations can be explained by disaster myopia. If there is a longer
episode without any shocks, people tend to underestimate the probability of a shock.
A sudden change in thinking can then be triggered by an unexpected or rather seldom
shock. In my third approach I use disaster myopia to explain the emergence and the
burst of real estate bubbles.
3.1 Mood Swings
Banks are run by humans and humans are in°uenced by their mood. If, for example,
loss rates are low and pro¯ts high bankers might become more optimistic and underes-
timate the risk of an investment (e.g. a mortgage loan). This behavior is supported by
the procyclicity of many risk models (e.g. Value at Risk): as long as nothing happens
these risk models signal a low risk but after a shock they start to signal a high risk.
In my ¯rst approach to explain and motivate the link between default rates and the
supply of mortgage loans, I assume that bank managers are subject to mood swings.
Even though they know the income distribution of the entire household sector, their
own customers might have an above or a below average income. If a bank is optimistic,
it might assume that its screening process was very successful and that its customers
have an above average income. On the other hand, if the bank is pessimistic it believes
that its customers' income is below average. A consequence of this assumption is that
if banks become more optimistic they are willing to provide higher mortgage loans
and real estate prices increase. This leads to lower default rates and, hence, to higher
pro¯ts for banks.
Further I assume that the mood of banks is positively in°uenced by their past
pro¯ts. If banks have an excess (positive) return they become more optimistic and if
they have a lower (negative) return they become more pessimistic. Or in other words,
banks become more optimistic if losses on their existing loan portfolio were lower than
expected and they become more pessimistic if losses were higher than expected. This
assumption re°ects the comovement of charge-o® rates and the tightening of lending
standards displayed in Figure 1.
Now assume that an external unexpected shock leads to a temporary increase in
labor income. This increase in income lowers the default rate among households and
increases pro¯ts of banks. Therefore, banks become more optimistic, real estate prices
increase, default rates fall and banks make high pro¯ts. This process pushes the real
12estate price higher and higher. However, if the real estate price and, therefore, the
mortgage burden for households becomes too high to be compensated by the price
increase, the process is reversed.
A very similar process is described by Lux (1995). He provides a theoretical expla-
nation for herding behavior by introducing a positive feedback between the develop-
ment of asset prices and investors' sentiment. To formalize this idea, I assume that an
optimistic bank expects that the loss rate (½o
t) in its loan portfolio will be:
E(½
o
t+1) = (1 ¡ ±)E(½t+1) = (1 ¡ ±)
1
2




where ± re°ects how strong the e®ect of optimism is on expectations. For a pessimistic





t+1) = (1 + ±)E(½t+1) = (1 + ±)
1
2




Banks are not necessarily entirely optimistic or pessimistic. I assume that in period
t all banks put the weight ºt on the optimistic view and the weight 1 ¡ ºt on the
pessimistic view. Therefore, ºt can be interpreted as the mood of the banks. In t for











t+1) = (1 ¡ ± ¡ 2±ºt)E(½t+1): (11)
As in the benchmark case in section 2.5 I assume that banks expect no changes in real








Under perfect competition this expected loss rate is equal to the interest rate spread
(m ¡ r). Therefore, the real estate price under mood swings (P m
t ) is given by:
15This is reasonable since the period t expectations for the loss rate in t+2 are equal to the period
t expectations for the loss rate in t + 1. Hence, the expected real estate price in t + 1 is qual to the




2(m ¡ r)N ¹ Y
m2(1 + ± ¡ 2±ºt)
: (13)
As we can see, this real estate price is equal to the benchmark price ¹ P if ºt = 0:5 and
the real estate price depends positively on the mood ºt. As long as banks are more
optimistic than pessimistic (ºt > 0:5) the real estate price exceeds its benchmark value
and vice versa.
I assume that banks are becoming more optimistic if the excess return is positive,
and they are becoming more pessimistic if it is negative.16 Under perfect competition
pro¯ts are expected to be zero. Hence, there is an excess return if pro¯ts are positive:
½t¡1 < m ¡ r.
ºt = ºt¡1 + ¿(m ¡ r ¡ ½t¡1)(1 ¡ ºt¡1) if ½t¡1 · m ¡ r and (14)
ºt = ºt¡1 + ¿(m ¡ r ¡ ½t¡1)ºt¡1 if ½t¡1 > m ¡ r; (15)
where ¿ re°ects how strongly the banks' mood is in°uenced by their pro¯ts. As we can
see, the mood (ºt) depends negatively on the realized loss rate in the previous period
(½t¡1). The realized loss rate, in turn, depends negatively on the price increase and
positively on the price level. As long as the real estate price increases on a moderate
level, loss rates are low and, given equation (13) and (14) real estate prices increase
further. However, if the price increase becomes too low to compensate for the high
price level, loss rates increase, banks become less optimistic and prices decrease again.
In order to illustrate the dynamic e®ects of mood swings, it is not necessary to
form and solve the resulting, rather complicated, di®erence equation. For the purpose
of this paper it is su±cient to simulate the system for di®erent parameter values. In
each of the examples I assume that:
² number of households: N = 10,
² maximum income: ¹ Y = 100,
² temporary income shock in t=5: Yt = 90,
² mortgage rate: m = 0:05,
16Lux (1995) and Hott (2007) use a very similar de¯nition.
14² ¯nancing rate: r = 0:04, and
² degree of optimism: ± = 0:25.
For the parameter ¿ (link between pro¯ts and mood) I consider di®erent values. As
we can see in Figure 4, the initial income shock in t = 5 leads to real estate prices
°uctuations in the following periods. For ¿ = 9:75 the shock leads to uniform sinus
shaped price cycles. With ¿ = 10 the speed of mood adjustment is higher and the
reaction to changes in pro¯ts is much stronger. This leads not only to higher amplitudes
of the real estate price °uctuations but the amplitudes also increase over time. In the
third example the opposite is the case: The weaker mood adjustment (¿ = 9:5) leads to
smaller and decreasing price °uctuations. In all three examples the peaks and troughs
of the cycle are not entirely symmetrical. The reason for this is that the development
of the loss rates is not linear.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
The real estate price °uctuations in Figure 4 are generated by mood swings of the
banks. These mood swings are, in turn, triggered by real estate price °uctuations.
Note that, even though banks are willing to provide higher mortgage loans in upswing
phases, the LTV is unchanged over the entire cycle. It is always 100%.17 However, the
a®ordability of homes changes over time. This has an e®ect on default rates among
households and, hence, on the pro¯ts of banks. Figure 5 displays the development of
the pro¯ts of the entire banking sector. As we can see, real estate price °uctuations
lead to positive pro¯ts in upswing phases and losses in downswing phases. However,
pro¯ts and losses are not symmetrical: Losses are higher than pro¯ts. This has two
reasons: Firstly, the real estate price cycles are not completely symmetrical themselves
and, secondly, the exposure of banks is higher in downswing phases than in upswing
phases.18
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
17To be more correct, what is really unchanged is the Loan-to-Price ratio. From a theoretical
point of view the fundamental value of houses should be constant over time. Hence, the real LTV is
°uctuating with the real estate price cycles. However, banks can not observe the fundamental value
and assume that the LTV is constant.
18The high exposure at the real estate price peak belongs to the downswing (loss) phase and the
low exposure at the trough of the cycle belongs to the upswing phase.
15The greater the in°uence of the banks' mood (high ¿) the higher are the °uctuations of
real estate prices and banks' pro¯ts. This emphasizes that it is important that banks
base their risk assessment on objective indicators rather than a subjective assessment
of the creditworthiness of their customers or just their past performance.
3.2 Momentum Forecasts
There are mainly two reasons to assume that banks base their forecasts on the momen-
tum of prices rather than on fundamentals. First, due to securitization the distance
between the borrower and the ultimate holder of the risk has increased. Therefore, it
is not always clear what the underlying economic fundamentals of an asset are. Fur-
thermore, highly diversi¯ed institutions often put di®erent assets into rather broad
classes that are not necessarily built on the underlying economic risk factors. For ex-
ample AAA mortgage backed securities might be treated in the same way as a AAA
corporate bond. The second reason to assume that banks base their forecasts on the
momentum of prices is that their models often have a very short memory. Value at
Risk (VaR) models, for example, often use a data sample of only three years. Given
that real estate cycles are about 15 years long, one can see that these models consider
only a phase of the cycle and, therefore, the momentum of the price development.
In this section I assume that banks base their forecasts for future real estate prices
and income on the past development of these variables. Expected real estate prices
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19I use the price from the previous period instead of the present price as the basis for the expected
price in the next period. Otherwise people would expect a certain price increase, no matter how high
the price is in the present period.










where k is the number of lags and 0 · ® · 1 is a parameter of the VAR. If we plug
these expectations into the expected loss rate equation (4) we get the expected loss
































In equilibrium this expected loss rate has to be equal to the interest rate spread m¡r.
This setup has an important consequence: If an exogenous shock leads to an increasing
real estate price in t¡1, the period t expectation for the real estate price in t+1 gets
higher. Following equation (4) this has a positive e®ect on the real estate price in t.
A higher price in t has a positive e®ect on period t + 1 expectations of the price in
t+2. This has, in turn, a positive e®ect on the price in t+1, and so on. This positive
feedback e®ect is slowed down, however, by the consideration of a fundamental factor:
income. As long as the real estate price increase is not accompanied by an appropriate
increase in income and the consideration of the income development is strong enough
(low ®) the price increase is reversed at some point and the real estate price is going
back again.
This mechanism is very similar to the one described by Hong and Stein (1999). They
develop a model of \news-watchers" and \momentum traders". Momentum traders can
amplify the e®ects of shocks. The behavior of news-watchers link the price development
to fundamentals. In my model agents (banks) base their forecasts on the momentum
of the price as well as on fundamentals. To illustrate the impact of my assumptions I
simulate the model for di®erent sets of parameters. In all examples I use the following
parameter values:
² number of households: N = 10,
² maximum income: ¹ Y = 100,
17² temporary income shock in t=5: Yt = 105,
² mortgage rate: m = 0:05, and
² ¯nancing rate: r = 0:04.
For the parameter ® and the number of lags k I consider di®erent values. For the
simulation displayed in Figure 6 k = 2. As we can see, the results are very similar to
the results for the mood swings approach in section 3.1. Only now amplitudes of the
real estate price °uctuations do not depend on the speed of mood adjustment (¿) but
on the weight on the real estate price growth rate (®). However, in both models the
positive feedback e®ect emerges because the behavior of banks has an in°uence on the
real estate price. This creates self-ful¯lling prophesies. With ® = 0:5 real estate price
°uctuations have decreasing amplitudes and with ® = 0:52 amplitudes are increasing
over time. Beside the real estate prices their expected values are displayed as well. As
we can see, in both cases the forecasts are very accurate. The reason for this is that
the forecasts are self-ful¯lling. Hence, banks feel no need to change their VAR model.21
One reason for the price bubbles created by the VAR forecast is that it uses very
short lags (k = 2). As shown in Figure 7, the amplitudes and the frequency of the real
estate price °uctuations can be reduced by using longer lags (k = 5;10). In this ¯gure
® = 0:52.
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
real estate price °uctuations created by the momentum forecasts of banks lead, of
course, also to °uctuations of their pro¯ts. These °uctuations are displayed in Figure
8 and 9.
[Insert Figure 8 about here.]
[Insert Figure 9 about here.]
21Hirshleifer et al. (2006) also point out that irrational trading positively a®ects asset prices and
thereby the pro¯ts of the irrational investors.
18As we have seen there are two elements that increase the adverse e®ects of the momen-
tum forecasts: a high weight on the price development rather than fundamentals (high
®) and short time lags (small k). This emphasizes that it is important that banks base
their forecasts on fundamentals and that they consider long time series.
3.3 Disaster Myopia
From time to time it is believed that houses are very safe investments. In many cases,
however, such a phase is ended abruptly by a real estate crisis. The question is: Why do
people (and banks) sometimes neglect or underestimate the possibility of declining real
estate prices? Herring and Wachter (1999) see a reason for this in a \disaster myopia".
Following this idea, agents underestimate the probability of a shock if previous shocks
occured long ago. This idea relies on Tversky and Kahneman's (1982) availability
heuristic. The authors write (1982, p. 164):
\The availability heuristic... uses strength of association as a basis for the
judgment of frequency... Availability is an ecologically valid clue for the
judgment of frequency because, in general, frequent events are easier to
recall or imagine than infrequent ones. However, availability is a®ected by
various factors which are unrelated to actual frequency."
One of the factors that a®ects availability is time. If an event occurred only recently it
might be more available than an event that happened long ago. In other words, banks
tend to forget events over time. A reason for this can be that humans tend to forget
and make mistakes but also the high turnover of sta® at banks.22
To illustrate the e®ects of disaster myopia on real estate prices, I make some small
changes to my basic model. First, I assume that in each period there is an income
shock (Y S < ¹ Y ) with probability ¯. Banks do not know, however, if this probability
is high (¯h) or low (¯l < ¯h). They assess the probability for a high ¯ by looking
at past shocks. The a priori probability for a high ¯ is assumed to be Pr(h) = 0:5.
Following Bayes' rule, under the condition that a shock (S¿) occurred in ¿, in t ¸ ¿
the probability for ¯h (Prt(h j S¿)) is:
22Guttentag and Herring (1984) also consider availability heuristic when modeling the subjective
probability of a shock. In addition they consider a threshold heuristic. Following this heuristic the
subjective probability drops to zero if it falls below a certain threshold.
19Prt(hjS¿) =
Prt(S¿jh)Pr(h)
Prt(S¿jh)Pr(h) + Prt(S¿jl)(1 ¡ Pr(h))
=
¯h
¯h + ¯l (21)
and under the condition that no shock (NS¿) occurred in ¿, it is:
Prt(hjNS¿) =
Prt(NS¿jh)Pr(h)
Pr(NSjh)Pr(h) + Prt(NS¿jl)(1 ¡ Pr(h))
=
1 ¡ ¯h
1 ¡ ¯h + 1 ¡ ¯l: (22)
Agents do not look at just a single signal, however. In each period there is either a
shock or not and these events provide a useful information. If banks consider the whole
history of signals (Ht) up to period t, the probability for a high ¯ is for example:
Prt(hjHt) =
(1 ¡ ¯h)(1 ¡ ¯h)¯h(1 ¡ ¯h)
(1 ¡ ¯h)(1 ¡ ¯h)¯h(1 ¡ ¯h) + (1 ¡ ¯l)(1 ¡ ¯l)¯l(1 ¡ ¯l)
=
¯h(1 ¡ ¯h)3
(¯h(1 ¡ ¯h)3 + ¯l(1 ¡ ¯l)3: (23)
In this case we have one shock and three periods without a shock. As we can see,
the sequence of the events is irrelevant for the probability Prt(hjHt). If we want to
consider disaster myopia, however, the sequence has to become relevant. To achieve
this, I introduce the parameter v (with 0 · v · 1). This parameter represents how
well past events can be recalled. If v = 1 agents perfectly remember all past events
and if v = 0 they only look at the current event. To formalize this, I assume that a
shock in t ¡ x < t leads to a probability assessment of:
Prt(hjSt¡x) =
(¯h)vx
(¯h)vx + (¯l)vx: (24)
For v = 1 and v = 0, vx and, therefore, Prt(hjSt¡x) is independent of the age of the
signal x.23 However, for intermediate values of v the age of the signal becomes relevant
and vx depends negatively on x. Since 0 < ¯l < ¯h < 1, (¯h)vx as well as (¯l)vx depend
negatively on vx and, therefore, positively on x. However, since (¯l)vx increases more
with x than (¯h)vx the probability Prt(hjSt¡x) decreases with x, although it stays
always above the a priori probability Pr(h) = 0:5. Now the sequence of events is very
23For v = 0 this is only true because x > 0. For x > 0, vx = 0 but for x = 0, vx would be 1.
20relevant: The older the signal the smaller its impact on the probability assessment of
banks. For the above example we get now:
Prt(hjHt) =
(1 ¡ ¯h)(1 ¡ ¯h)v(¯h)v2(1 ¡ ¯h)v3
(1 ¡ ¯h)(1 ¡ ¯h)v(¯h)v2(1 ¡ ¯h)v3 + (1 ¡ ¯l)(1 ¡ ¯l)v(¯l)v2(1 ¡ ¯l)v3
=
(¯h)v2(1 ¡ ¯h)1+v+v3






i=0(vi)¡vx + (¯l)vx(1 ¡ ¯l)§t¡1
i=0(vi)¡vx: (25)
The general solution for a single shock in equation (25) is very similar to that in
equation (24) only now the episodes with no signal are considered aswell. It is easy
to see that (1 ¡ ¯h)§t¡1
i=0(vi)¡vx and (1 ¡ ¯l)§t¡1
i=0(vi)¡vx depend negatively on x. Since
(1 ¡ ¯h) < (1 ¡ ¯l), the denominator of equation (25) increases relatively more than
the numerator. Hence, the overall e®ect of an increasing x on the probability of a high
¯ is still negative and even more negative than in equation (24).
Given the probability of a high probability of a shock Prt(hjHt), in t the probability
for an income shock (¯t) in the next period is:
¯t = Prt(hjHt)¯
h + (1 ¡ Prt(hjHt))¯
l (26)
and the period t expectation with regard to the maximum income in t + 1 is:
Et(Yt+1) = ¯tY
s + (1 ¡ ¯t)¹ Y : (27)
Since Et[Prt+i(hjHt+1)] = Prt(hjHt) with i > 0, today's expectation with regard to
future income is identical to today's expectation with regard to the income in the next
period: Et(Yt+x) = Et(Yt+1). Hence, similar to equation (8), the real estate price in




Since the age of the previous shock (x) has a negative e®ect on the probability of a high
probability of a shock Prt(hjHt), it has also a negative e®ect on the expected shock
21probability ¯t and, therefore, a positive e®ect on expected future income (Et(Yt+1))
and today's real estate price (Pt). In other words, if there is a long episode without
any shock, the estimated shock probability gets lower and real estate prices increase.
However, if suddenly a shock occurs, the age of the previous shock x and, therefore the
real estate price jump to a much lower level. To illustrate these e®ects, I simulate the
model for the following parameter values:
² number of households: N = 10,
² maximum income: ¹ Y = 100,
² income shock: Y S = 80,
² high shock probability: ¯h = 0:2,
² low shock probability: ¯l = 0:01,
² true shock probability: ¯ = 0:2,
² mortgage rate: m = 0:05, and
² ¯nancing rate: r = 0:04.
For the parameter v I consider di®erent values. Shocks occur randomly with the prob-
ability ¯ = ¯h = 0:2. Figure 10 shows the development of the probability assessment
(Prt(hjHt)) for di®erent values of v. As we can see, if banks do not forget previous
events (v = 1), they learn quickly that the true shock probability is ¯ = 0:2 and
P(hjH) gets close to 100%. On the other hand, if banks only consider the current
period (v = 0) their probability assessment jumps between the result of equation (21)
and the result of equation (22). Each time a shock occurs the probability for a high
shock probability jumps up and it is low when there is no shock.
[Insert Figure 10 about here.]
More interesting are the cases of intermediate values of v. With v = 0:95 banks
learn quite fast as well. However, if there are longer episodes without any shock, the
22probability for a high probability of a shock can decline substantially and can even get
smaller then with v = 0.24
The changing risk assessment of banks has an e®ect on real estate prices. If banks
believe that the shock probability is low, they are willing to provide higher mortgage
loans and real estate prices rise. Figure 11 shows the development of real estate prices
for v = 0:75 and v = 0:95. As we can see, in contrast to the mood swings and the
momentum forecast model variations, we now do not get uniformly sinus shaped price
°uctuations. If we consider disaster myopia real estate prices sharply drop after an
income shock. With v = 0:75 real estate price bubbles are more frequent than with
v = 0:95. If the episode without any shock is very long, however, the bubble can get
bigger with v = 0:95. The corresponding development of the pro¯ts is displayed in
Figure 12. As we can see, banks make positive pro¯ts in the upswing phases and they
su®er very high losses when the bubbles burst.
[Insert Figure 11 about here.]
[Insert Figure 12 about here.]
These results show that it is important that banks consider long time series (long
memory or high v) for their risk assessment. However, the results also show that it is
important that past events are considered in the same objective way as recent events.
4 Conclusions
Banks are often among the victims of real estate crises. On the other hand, there
is some evidence that banks also contribute to the creation of the problems. They
provide more and more ¯nancial resources for real estate purchases and, thereby, help
to create a price bubble. When the bubble bursts they are heavily exposed and su®er
high losses.
In this paper I have shown how banks can create real estate cycles through their be-
havior, namely their expectation formation. They make high pro¯ts in upswing phases
but su®er high(er) losses when the market turns. In my ¯rst approach banks become
24It is important to note that this e®ect works in the other direction as well: If the true ¯ is 0.01,
banks overestimate the risk whenever a shock occurs. However, I only look at the case where banks
underestimate the risk (¯ = 0:2).
23over- or under-con¯dent because of the good or bad performance of their mortgage
loans. The higher or lower con¯dence leads to higher or lower loans and, therefore, to
higher or lower real estate prices. In a second approach I have shown how momentum
forecasts can lead to overreactions and persistent °uctuations. Finally, I have shown
that disaster myopia can lead to an underestimation of risks. This creates real estate
price bubbles which burst if a shock occurs.
With regard to ¯nancial stability, these ¯ndings have several implications: Firstly,
they show that it is important that banks base their risk assessment on objective in-
dicators. This also implies that procyclical risk models should be avoided. Secondly,
forecasts of default rates and real estate prices should be based on their driving eco-
nomic fundamentals rather than just their past development. Thirdly, it is important
that banks base their risk as well as forecasting models on long time series. Otherwise
the models capture only the short term momentum of default rates or real estate prices
and shocks can catch banks unprepared.
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